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REFLECTIONS ON SPACE GOVERNANCE BY CHINA AND 
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Saadia M. Pekkanen* 
   
I am very glad to have the opportunity to reflect on the theme of space 
governance at a historical juncture in a changing world order. Governing outer 
space is getting harder to do, with the changing technologies in space activi-
ties, the rise of new stakeholders, and the geopolitical flux around us today.1 
We are talking about developing peaceful relations through governance 
frameworks in a space domain in which peace is not a given. In fact, peaceful 
prospects in outer space are at a low point, and outright conflict is a distinct 
possibility. So, it is all the more important today to think about the building 
blocks of space governance, and what is and is not possible if we want to avoid 
conflict and war in and through space.   
I will be concentrating my remarks on two spacefaring countries, China 
and Japan, to give a regional flavor to broader global debates about space 
governance. China and Japan are of course not new entrants, but long-standing 
and established ones. They are also embedded within the global legal govern-
ing frameworks. As some of the world’s top, technically competent, and po-
litically ambitious space powers, what China and Japan do or don’t do at the 
domestic and regional levels is also significantly likely to shape the peaceful 
prospects for outer space.  Like all other spacefaring powers today, they too 
have to perform the balancing act between encouraging democratization, 
boosting commercialization, and containing militarization. This is where 
space governance needs to situate itself, with attention to the role of states and 
industrial strategies, including national interests in strategic dual-use sectors 
like space. Given their pivotal status in the world order today, the interests of 
the Japanese and Chinese states are especially pivotal as a handful of the 
world’s top and independent space powers who back and consume technolo-
gies, make strategies and policies, and, of interest here, put their own designs 
on governance. 
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With this context in mind, I want to reflect on three interrelated questions. 
First, to begin with, what is governance? I draw on long established thinking 
in international relations as well as international law to say that for stakehold-
ers in the space domain, this broadly means formal and informal laws, insti-
tutions, processes, and practices that structure relations, stabilize expectations, 
guide and restrain behavior, and frame policy responses. In theory, govern-
ance is meant to develop a common legal and policy understanding that can 
provide predictability, clarity and consistency for all players. 
If the aim of states is to use space peacefully based on a set of principles 
in governing frameworks, their efforts to do so are complicated by the deeply 
intertwined forces of democratization, commercialization, and militarization 
I noted at the start.2 Democratization has brought new and varied players into 
the game, who don’t necessarily see eye to eye on where space governance or 
legal interpretation should head. Commercialization has brought in a new gen-
eration of technology entrepreneurs bent on profiting all the way to off-world 
settlements, often backed by law and policy from their home governments 
pitted against those of other equally determined governments. Militarization 
affects national security architectures, postures, and warfighting supremacy, 
and today it is moving towards outright weaponization, with ASAT testing 
out in the open. Just think of China in 2007, USA in 2008, and India in 2019, 
and Japan too has a history of testing counterspace technologies. 
What all this means is that despite the rise of a new generation of exciting 
new players and entrepreneurs and activities, outer space affairs are still 
rooted in the geopolitics around us. Peaceful prospects in outer space are at 
risk today because of how all states—including China and Japan—are bend-
ing their dual-use space technologies and trajectories far more rapidly in the 
direction of militarization, and frankly outright weaponization. Great powers, 
concerned with their rise and decline in the world order, see space as an am-
plifier for their power and are restructuring their civilian, commercial, and 
military strategies to gain supremacy in space. This trend affects even compa-
nies that started out with bold visions for commercialization but who are turn-
ing to defense contracts to survive. Meanwhile, from the perspective of gov-
ernance, we also see worrying trends of treaty stasis, decline, and even exit 
more broadly that may also end up infecting the global legal outer space re-
gime we have in place today. 
Second, in this tumultuous mix, what do regional efforts by space powers 
like China and Japan add to the prospects for the peaceful governance of outer 
space activities? It helps to understand what these two countries have done to 
date in terms of shaping the governance of space activities. 
Since the early 1990s, each country has taken a keen interest in shaping 
the governance of outer space activities through the creation of indigenous 
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institutions that resonate especially at the regional level. Both countries stress 
a peaceful and cooperative vision and the importance of socio-economic de-
velopment. But they have done so through remarkably different institutional 
types, which call into question Asian states’ supposed preference for soft and 
informal international forums for governance all the time.3 I will take each of 
these institutions4 in turn and also identify strengths and shortcomings in each. 
Japan has led the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF), 
involving both state and non-state participants, which is guided by a set of 
principles.5 It dates back to 1993, and its signature event is the annual meeting 
in the Asia-Pacific region with a quarter-century track record. It is billed as 
the largest space-related conference of its type with both public and private 
stakeholders.6 Four specific working groups feed into the information clear-
inghouse of the annual meeting and form the basis for engaging participants 
in a wide variety of projects: specifically Space Application, Space Technol-
ogy, Space Environment Utilization, and Space Education.7 APRSAF is es-
sentially a dialogue-based platform, attracting lots of participants. It has an 
open and flexible cooperative framework, voluntary and cooperative activi-
ties, and focuses on solving regional issues that draw on the thematic foci of 
the working groups. As of November 2017, its participants included 727 or-
ganizations from forty-six countries and regions, and twenty-eight interna-
tional organizations.8 As an institutional type, APRSAF is an informal organ-
izational structure with soft rules. But it has made some moves toward 
formalizing its procedures, with the formation of an executive committee (Ex-
Com) in 2012 and a set of principles (again voluntary) in 2013.9 Japan is in a 
leadership role but an understated one. There are no clear underlying rules 
such as a charter or identifiable headquarters, or a sense of where APRSAF is 
headed in the region’s political realities. 
 
 3 See  ASIAN DESIGNS: GOVERNANCE IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD ORDER Table 1.1 
(Saadia M. Pekkanen ed., Cornell Univ. Press 2016) for an institutional typology based on 
legal rules and organizational structures that brings a wide variety of governance mecha-
nisms under one analytical rubric [hereinafter ASIAN DESIGNS]. 
 4 For earlier works on these institutions, see JAMES CLAY MOLTZ, Asian Space Rivalry 
and Cooperative Institutions: Mind the Gap, in ASIAN DESIGNS, supra note 3, at 116–134; 
GLOBAL SPACE GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL STUDY 65–86 (Ram S. Jakhu & Joseph 
N. Pelton eds., 2017). 
 5 See basic information about APRSAF, its annual meetings, and participants at 
APRSAF, https://www.aprsaf.org/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2020). 
 6  About, APRSAF, https://www.aprsaf.org/about/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2020). 
 7  APRSAF, ASIA-PACIFIC REGIONAL SPACE AGENCY FORUM,  https://www.aprsaf.org/a 
bout/leaflet/APRSAF_leaflet_en.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2020). 
 8  Countries and Regions, APRSAF, https://www.aprsaf.org/participants/ (last visited 
Mar. 27, 2020). 
 9  ASIA-PACIFIC REGIONAL SPACE AGENCY FORUM (APRSAF) TASK FORCE FINAL 
REPORT, APRSAF Annex III, https://www.aprsaf.org/about/pdf/TF_Report_(Final-13Dec 
12).pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2020). 
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China has opted, in contrast, for a high-profile formal intergovernmental 
design, the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO).10 This 
was established in 2008, giving it a track record over a decade old (but it dates 
its origins to a 1992 MOU, and even before that to an idea among China, 
Pakistan and Thailand in 1988 for multilateral cooperation in the Asia-Pa-
cific).11 Like APRSAF, APSCO has thematic foci on broad issues that allows 
for the set up of a variety of activities and engagements: education and talent 
training with universities; cooperative networks on space technology, appli-
cations and so on; knowledge-sharing platforms such as on law and policy; 
and cooperation with international organizations.12 As an institutional type 
APSCO is a formal intergovernmental organization with hard rules set out in 
a Convention, and China is in a dominant leadership position with a headquar-
ter in Beijing.13 Eight states signed the Convention of the Asia-Pacific Space 
Cooperative Organization (APSCO) in October 2005, and with the exception 
of China none of them are prominent space powers with strong industrial ba-
ses.14 Aside from China, the original signatories were Bangladesh, Indonesia, 
Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru, Thailand, with Turkey signing on in 2006. 15 
But in all APSCO still only has eight formal member states in 2020, with 
Indonesia not yet identified as a Member State but only as a signatory state 
and Mexico as an observer state.16 Despite its foundational rules and leader-
ship clarity, it remains to be seen whether APSCO will expand to other formal 
members, and if so, who those might be. Like APRSAF its role in regional 
and extra-regional settings remains a work in progress. 
Third, where does all this leave us in terms of the prospects for the peace-
ful—or more sensibly cooperative—governance of outer space in the years 
ahead? There are always headline news about the rivalry between Japan and 
China, and you might think this is affecting their completely distinct and sep-
arate efforts at space governance, but the picture is more complicated in real-
ity. It also offers glimmers of hope if we focus on engaged practice and not 
just abstract principles in a political context. 
 
 10 For the background information on APSCO, see APSCO, http://www.apsco.int/ (last 
visited Mar. 23, 2020). 
 11 History Trace, APSCO, http://www.apsco.int/html/comp1/content/historytrace/2018- 
06-26/21-153-1.shtml (last visited Mar. 27, 2020). 
 12 About APSCO, APSCO, http://www.apsco.int/html/comp1/content/WhatisAPSCO/2 
018-06-06/33-144-1.shtml (last visited Mar 27, 2020). 
 13 APSCO, supra note 12; APSCO Structure, APSCO, http://www.apsco.int/html/comp 
sco1/content/APSCOStructure/2019-02-28/68-258-1.shtml (last visited Mar. 27, 2020). 
 14 APSCO, CONVENTION OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC SPACE COOPERATION ORGANIZATION 
(APSCO), http://www.apsco.int/upload/file/20180525/2018052510341620388.pdf  (last 
visited Mar. 27, 2020). 
 15 Id. 
 16 APSCO, supra note 12. 
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The policy considerations draw attention to the shifting nature of Japan-
China relations, one that is seeking more collaboration. Frankly, if you don’t 
also keep your eye on the political and policy context, all the law and the 
governance in the world is not going to matter. The present leadership of both 
countries—Shinzo Abe and Xi Jinping—have called for a “new era” of Japan-
China relations,17 and analysts have begun to point to a thawing of relations 
between the two countries. While it sounds like high rhetoric that has a long 
way to go, I would say the search for a new Sino-Japanese era is taking place 
in a context that is very different from before. We are in a world order where 
perceptions of American unpredictability and wavering commitments to re-
gional stability have gained ground—concerns voiced even by influential 
players in Japan,18 America’s formal ally in the region.   
I think we all probably agree that we are not going to be getting any new 
global multilateral treaties any time soon in outer space. With the changes in 
Sino-Japanese interactions, the question is do the present mechanisms of 
APRSAF and APSCO present us with concrete legal bases for thinking about 
governance mechanisms. My point of departure here is that as the Chinese 
and Japanese states seek to govern outer space directly through indigenous 
institutions their efforts are also embedded in a global framework in which 
they have legal obligations to uphold. These realities present an opportunity. 
There are building blocks in place—some also in these two institutions—that 
may facilitate small and voluntary move towards greater collaboration among 
these two countries in the space domain.   
At the international level, in response to a proposal in 2012 by the United 
States, and cosponsored by China, Japan, Ecuador, Peru, and Saudi Arabia, 
the Legal Subcommittee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space (COPUOUS) agreed to undertake a “‘review of international mecha-
nisms for cooperation in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space.’”19  
The review suggested these mechanisms can take a variety of forms, such as 
multilateral or bilateral, legally binding or not, for example.20 This notable 
variation has led to a better—and more pragmatic—appreciation of how co-
operation can be customized based on basic legal principles of specific interest 
to states.   
 
 17 Xi, Abe Agree to Build China-Japan Relations in Accordance with Needs of New Era, 
XINHUA (June 28, 2019), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-06/28/c_138179475.ht 
m. 
 18 Mark Landler, As Next Trump-Kim Summit Nears, Japan Worries U.S. Will Leave It 
in the Dark, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/23/world/asia/ 
shinzo-abe-north-korea-trump.html. 
 19 See Setsuko Aoki, Models for Coordination and Cooperation: Bilateral and Multilat-
eral Agreements 1–35, Presentation at the 10th United Nations Workshop on Space Law 
(Sept. 7, 2016), https://www.unoosa.org/pdf/SLW2016/Panel4/3._Aoki_10th_UN_Space 
_Law_WS_S._Aoki7_Sept._2016Panel_4.pdf . 
 20 Id. at 11–15. 
736 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. [Vol. 48:731 
This same mode of thinking applies to regional mechanisms for facilitating 
cooperation, such as APSCO and APRSAF. As I noted above, they are con-
stituted as very distinct and different institutional types. But as you never 
know across this diverse landscape just what can become a building block for 
cooperation or manifest as collaboration, here are the more important points. 
The institutional type for China’s APSCO’s is a formal inter-governmental 
organization, with a hard-rules convention, the APSCO Convention. 21 Article 
24 of the APSCO Convention provides a possible building block for cooper-
ation with other organization, first and foremost with agencies in the United 
Nations system and particularly COPUOUS.22 Article 24.2 of the Convention 
of APSCO also leaves the door open for APSCO to build “cooperative part-
nerships” with those who are not member states as well as “other international 
organizations and institutions in pursuit of its objectives”—say, APRSAF—
as long as doing so has the unanimous approval of, and appropriate guidelines 
and procedures from, the APSCO Council.  
As an institutional type, Japan’s APRSAF is an informal organization with 
soft rules, principles, and practices that are reflected in its annual signature 
conference. One notable engagement came with APSCO in its latest confer-
ence, APRSAF-26, held in November 2019 in Nagoya Japan.23 Along with 
other delegations from national space agencies, governments, international 
and regional organizations, universities, and industries, the delegation from 
APSCO attended the conference. In practice, this meant it attended various 
working groups, sharing opinions and working out common interests.   
Looking ahead, the project-based possibilities for cooperation also come 
out of the thematic foci of the working groups of both APSCO and APRSAF 
noted above. The working groups can provide a basis for thinking about or 
advancing applications related to say orbital debris removal or the prolifera-
tion of small satellites and big data.  And from that kind of operational content, 
the two institutions can also help affect practices and possibly affect norms 
related to significant pockets of outer space activities that may be brewing 
mistrust or problems between countries around the world. At the very least 
this is worth thinking about if, as I said at the start, we are interested in the 
peaceful governance of outer space. 
Finally, let me say that we cannot predict anything with cookie-cutter pre-
cision about the shape and kind of cooperation that is likely to emerge whether 
between China and Japan or others. At the very least, we need to think about 
how various institutional types can help bring it about, with sensitivity to the 
political context. And here I want to leave you with some reflections about 
governance in the next fifty years by going back about fifty years to the start 
 
 21 See the provisions of the APSCO Convention at ASPCO, supra note 14. 
 22 Id. at Article 24 (Cooperation With Other Entities). 
 23 APSCO Delegation Attended APRSAF-26, APSCO (Dec. 19, 2019), http://www.apsc 
o.int/html/comp1/content/NewsHighlights/2019-12-19/54-341-1.shtml. 
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of the old space race, and to a wise observation about what we can expect as 
we move into uncharted territories: 
One may indeed expect with rather more confidence a series 
of agreements . . . .The modes of reaching such agreements 
cannot be charted with any precision. Some agreements may 
be explicit and formal; some may be simply a consensus 
achieved by the gradual accretion of custom from repeated in-
stances of mutual toleration. Some may be bilateral, other tri-
lateral or multilateral; some may be within the framework of 
the United Nations, others within some other existing organi-
zation or some machinery yet to be set up. Their details and 
sequence must, like much else in an indeterminate universe, 
depend on the order of experience in space as well as on the 
changing political context.24 
 
 
 24 Myres S. McDougal & Leon Lipson, Perspectives for a Law of Outer Space, 52 AM. 
J. INT’L 407, 429–30 (1958). 
